




Olav Jones, Deputy Director General

Rome, 13 December 2014




Insurance Europe - the (Re)Insurance Federation



- Insurance Europe represents around 95% of European insurance market by premium income
- Insurers, Reinsurers, Mutuals
- European insurance market: largest market in the world (35% share in 2013)
- 34 members (national associations)
 - **27 EU member states**
 - **5 non-EU markets** (*Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Liechtenstein*)
 - **2 associate members** (*Serbia, San Marino*)
 - **1 partner** (*Russia*)

Investing is a consequence of our business model ...


- Investment is core to the provision of insurance products but is **driven by the nature of our liabilities and our need to match our liabilities**



... and creates benefits for Policyholders, for Economic growth, and Financial stability

...and results in our role as being Europe's largest institutional and long-term investor

European institutional assets under management — 31 December 2012



Sources: Insurance Europe, OECD, EFAMA, SWF Institute, Forbes

...in addition to our central role of providing protection

Long-term Investment: We welcome the new Commission's focus on investment and growth

- Provides opportunity to consider in a wider context the industry's long-term investment objectives and Europe's investment needs
- Explore solutions to enable insurers to maintain and grow their role in providing long-term financing
- We recognise the interest in asset classes which can have the most immediate impact on growth
 - Infrastructure investments (equity, bonds, Project Bonds, PPPs)
 - Securitisations
 - SME investments (equity, bonds, private placement)

Steps to unlocking insurers' potential capacity to invest in real economy

1 Maintain/grow inflow of premiums for investment

- We can only invest if we get premiums –eg policymakers need to think carefully before removing incentives to save - eg tax incentives

2 Improve supply and access to suitable assets ...

3 Avoid and remove regulatory disincentives

2) Barriers to supply and access to suitable assets

Emerging views on barriers ...

- Adequate supply
 - Lack of sufficient deal flow of suitable infrastructure projects
 - Need for an identified infrastructure asset class
 - New initiatives should avoid heterogeneous fund structures and crowding-out of institutional investors
- Accessibility
 - Complex and lengthy procurement processes
 - High initial acquisition costs
 - Lack of standardised disclosure, transparency and due diligence requirements
 - Concentration risk and deal size
- Risk/return features
 - Uncertainty and political risks of government interference
 - Lack of distinction between the different stages of infrastructure investment (brownfield vs greenfield)

3) Avoidance/removal of regulatory disincentives

- Good regulation is important for a healthy industry
- A raft of regulatory changes can affect insurers' investment behaviour, including:
 - Prudential (Solvency II)
 - Accounting (IFRS 4 Phase 2/IFRS 9)
 - Derivatives (EMIR)
- Regulation and design of the supply side is also key
- Regulations must take into account the distinctive characteristics of the insurance industry

Solvency II calibrations of long-term investment are too high compared to the real risks

- Strong support of a risk-based approach, but vital to measure based on the true economic risk exposure
- Despite improvements, SII still assumes insurers act like traders and are faced with same risk as traders – still undervaluing how long-term liabilities can reduce exposure to market volatility
- Example 1: capital charge for 5 year AA high-quality securitisation

Original Calibration (QIS5)	80%	← Spread-risk approach
EIOPA proposal (end-2013)	42.5%	
Final calibration (Sept. 2014)	15%	← Default-risk approach
Actual default during entire crisis period	0.14%	

- Example 2: capital charges for infrastructure

Infrastructure equity (<i>treated same as hedge funds</i>)	49%	(+/- 10%)	← Spread-risk approach
Infrastructure 25year bond AA (treated same as corporate bond)	16%		
Worst level of actual defaults in crisis period for AA corporate Bonds	0.38%		← Default-risk approach